

IT'S COMPLICATED

The stock market continues to be volatile due to an overvalued stock market, indexes rising due to the influence of momentous stocks, geopolitical concerns, global market concerns and the trade war. The major effects of the tax cut passed by Congress will end at the end of 2018 as far as earnings growth goes.

The Stock Market (from the FACTSET “Earnings Insight July 27, 2018”)

Key Metrics

- Earnings Scorecard: For Q2 2018 (with 53% of the companies in the S&P 500 reporting actual results for the quarter), 83% of S&P 500 companies have reported a positive EPS surprise and 77% have reported a positive sales surprise. If 83% is the final number, it will mark the highest percentage since FactSet began tracking this metric in Q3 2008.
- Earnings Growth: For Q2 2018, the blended earnings growth rate for the S&P 500 is 21.3%. If 21.3% is the actual growth rate for the quarter, it will mark the second highest earnings growth since Q3 2010 (34.1%).
- Earnings Revisions: On June 30, the estimated earnings growth rate for Q2 2018 was 20.0%. Nine sectors have higher growth rates today (compared to June 30) due to upward estimate revisions and positive earnings surprises.
- Earnings Guidance: For Q3 2018, 29 S&P 500 companies have issued negative EPS guidance and 14 S&P 500 companies have issued positive EPS guidance.
- Valuation: The forward 12-month P/E ratio for the S&P 500 is 16.7. This P/E ratio is above the 5-year average (16.2) and above the 10-year average (14.4).

Looking Ahead: Forward Estimates and Valuation

Earnings Guidance: Negative EPS Guidance For Q3 2018 is Below Average

The term “guidance” (or “preannouncement”) is defined as a projection or estimate for EPS provided by a company in advance of the company reporting actual results. Guidance is classified as negative if the estimate (or mid-point of a range estimates) provided by a company is lower than the mean EPS estimate the day before the guidance was issued. Guidance is classified as positive if the estimate (or mid-point of a range of estimates) provided by the company is higher than the mean EPS estimate the day before the guidance was issued.

At this point in time, 43 companies in the index have issued EPS guidance for Q3 2018. Of these 43 companies, 29 have issued negative EPS guidance and 14 has issued positive EPS guidance. The percentage of companies issuing negative EPS guidance is 67% (29 out of 43), which is below the 5-year average of 72%.

Near 20% Earnings Growth Expected For 2018, But Lower Growth Projected for Early 2019

For the second quarter, companies reporting earnings growth of 21.3% and revenue growth of 9.3%. Analysts currently expect earnings to grow near 20% for the remainder 2018, but also expect more moderate growth for early 2019.

For Q3 2018, analysts are projecting earnings growth of 21.2% and revenue growth of 7.7%.
For Q4 2018, analysts are projecting earnings growth of 18.0% and revenue growth of 6.0%.
For Q1 2019, analysts are projecting earnings growth of 7.3% and revenue growth of 5.8%.
For Q2 2019, analysts are projecting earnings growth of 10.2% and revenue growth of 4.8%.

Valuation: Forward P/E Ratio is 16.7, above the 10-Year Average (14.4)

The forward 12-month P/E ratio is 16.7. This P/E ratio is above the 5-year average of 16.2, and above the 10-year average of 14.4. It is also above the forward 12-month P/E ratio of 16.1 recorded at the start of the third quarter (June 30). Since the start of the third quarter, the price of the index has increased by 4.4%, while the forward 12-month EPS estimate has increased by 1.0%.

At the sector level, the Consumer Discretionary (21.2) and Information Technology (19.0) sectors have the highest forward 12-month P/E ratios, while the Telecom Services (9.8) and Financials (12.7) sectors have the lowest forward 12-month P/E ratios. Eight sectors have forward 12-month P/E ratios that are above their 10-year averages, led by the Information Technology (19.0 vs. 14.5) and Consumer Discretionary (21.2 vs. 16.9) sectors. Two sectors have forward 12-month P/E ratios that are below their 10-year averages, led by the Telecom Services (9.8 vs. 14.0) sector.

Targets & Ratings: Analysts Project 10% Increase in Price Over Next 12 Months

The bottom-up target price for the S&P 500 is 3123.49, which is 10.1% above the closing price of 2837.44. At the sector level, the Materials (+14.3%) and Telecom Service (+13.7%) sectors are expected to see the largest price increases, as these sectors have the largest upside differences between the bottom-up target price and the closing price. On the other hand, the Utilities (+3.3%) sector is expected to see the smallest price increase, as this sector has the smallest upside difference between the bottom-up target price and the closing price.

Overall, there are 10,905 ratings on stocks in the S&P 500. Of these 10,905 ratings, 53.0% are Buy ratings, 41.6% are Hold ratings, and 5.4% are Sell ratings. At the sector level, the Information Technology (59%), Health Care (59%), Energy (58%), and Materials (58%) sectors have the highest percentages of Buy ratings, while the Telecom Services (41%) sector has the lowest percentage of Buy ratings.

Price/Earnings Ratios (P/E Ratios)

On July 31, 2018 the P/E Ratios of the key indexes were as follows:

Dow Jones Industrial Average
23.06x Trailing 12 months, 16.59x Forward
S&P 500 Index
24.13x Trailing 12 months, 17.65x Forward
NASDAQ Composite Index
26.11x Trailing 12 months, 21.43x Forward

The trailing numbers are very high versus historic P/E Ratios. The Forward estimates are high compared to Historic Forward estimates. With the stock market overvalued waiting for the earnings growth numbers to come in there are those that may get nervous and may take profits as we get closer to year end. We will watch this closely.

Value Versus Growth

In the Performance Executive Summary in the Market Data section you will find a chart entitled “Value Versus Growth”. It shows that about half of the time Value stocks outperform Growth stocks, and the other half Growth outperforms Value. In 2017 and the first half of 2018 Growth outperformed Value. In the latest year ending June 30, 2018 the Russell 1000 Growth index returned 22.5% while the Russell 1000 Value Index returned 6.8%. In the second quarter Growth was up 5.8% and Value only 1.2%. The Growth Index has been lead by its largest holdings: Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook and Alphabet (Google). Information technology makes up 41.5% of the index. The Value Index’s largest holdings are JP Morgan, Exxon, Berkshire Hathaway, Johnson & Johnson, and Bank of America. As the chart shows, at some point Value will start outperforming Growth.

This is why we split the small cap and large cap stock allocations 50%-50% between Growth and Value. As investors get worried do not be surprised that money moves from growth stocks to value stocks that are less expensive.

The Fed and Interest Rates

You will see in the Market Data section of the Performance Executive Summary a table that documents the dates and results of historic Federal Reserve Rate Hikes. If the Fed continues to raise short-term rates and the Yield Curve flattens or inverts, the odds are we will have a recession. As the Fed has raised rates the long end of the curve has remained relatively stable because of large investors from around the world, where rates are lower than the US, are buying Treasuries. The projection is that the Fed will raise rates two more times this year. The current federal funds rate is 2.0%. The Fed has signaled that it will raise rates to 2.5% in 2018, 3.0% in 2019 and 3.5% in 2020.

Inflation

Inflation is not an issue at this point and according to Hoisington Investment Management will not be in the foreseeable future. (See Market Data)

International Stocks Versus US Stocks

The international equity market is less expensive based on forward P/E Ratios of the S&P 500 and the MSCI All County World Index. (See Market Data) Therefore, the international market is more attractive at this time than the US market based on this measure.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

GDP was running at a 4.1% rate in the second quarter. It is projected to slow down going forward. (See Hoisington)

Energy

Oil is expected to rise in price because production over the next one to two years is expected to fall. Production in Venezuela, Mexico and Iran is expected to fall. Venezuela and Mexico have not invested in oil infrastructure and their fields are suffering. We know that the US sanctions on Iran are pointed at lowering its revenues from the sale of oil. The Permian Basin in Texas could make up the difference, but currently there are not enough pipelines to get the oil out. Pipelines are being built but it will take time to do. Oil and oil services stocks are expected to do well as a result.

Emerging Markets

Emerging markets are suffering due to the stronger dollar. Countries with dollar denominated debt have to pay more when the dollar is strong.

China and the Trade War

China GDP has been slowing. The Trade War is affecting its economy and is affecting US stocks in industries that are vulnerable.

Hoisington

We have included the entire Hoisington Investment Management Company “Quarterly Review and Outlook Second Quarter 2018”. Although it is somewhat technical, you should find it enlightening and interesting. You can begin to understand the underlying dynamics that affect the global economy and why we must not assume that this long rally in the stock market since March 2009 will continue indefinitely and why interest rates and inflation are not something to worry about at this point.

Conclusion

What does all this mean? In the near term, we do not expect much to change. As we get closer to the end of 2018, we will be watching institutional investors to see if and when they start taking profits and if money moves from growth stocks to value stocks. We will be watching the yield curve. If the Fed continues to raise short-term rates to a level that flattens or inverts the curve, we will be recommending a reduction in equity allocation. We will monitor what Hoisington points out about debt and GDP. Earnings growth is a key factor in the stock market. The consensus is that growth will slow after 2018. This should affect P/E ratios and could cause a correction by itself. The US stock indexes have risen because of the large influence of a few stocks like the FANGs, and a move to indexing including ETFs. As a result, many weak companies with poor balance sheets and poor earnings growth have risen in price because they are in the indexes. This will reverse at some point like all fads have in the past.

Jamison Monroe
Chairman & CEO
Director of Consulting

Monroe Vos has over \$5 billion under advisement for 96 clients. Recent rankings are as follows:

- The largest independent registered investment advisor (“RIA”) in Texas according to *Financial Advisor* magazine in July 2018
- 51st largest independent RIA in the United States as reported by *Financial Advisor* magazine in July 2018
- 2nd largest Wealth Management Firm of the Top 21 in Houston according to the *Houston Business Journal, 2016-2017 Book of Lists*.

Hoisington

INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY

6836 Bee Caves Rd. B2 S100, Austin, TX 78746 (512) 327-7200

www.Hoisington.com

Quarterly Review and Outlook

Second Quarter 2018

Expectations and Disappointments

Coming out of 2017, expectations were widespread that a synchronized global expansion lay ahead for 2018. Forward momentum was thought to prevail in Europe, Japan and the emerging markets. A doubling of the growth rate in public and private debt in 2017 over the prior year's rate seemingly pointed to better performance in China, and a sizeable tax cut was expected to propel U.S. economic growth upward and contribute to improving global conditions. However, business conditions outside the U.S. have significantly disappointed thus far in 2018. Europe's growth has abruptly slowed and Japan's GDP contracted in the first quarter. China's GDP growth rates remain at historically low levels and, in May, China experienced the slowest year-over-year growth in retail spending in fifteen years. Additionally, numerous problems have arisen in key emerging markets including Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Turkey and others. These developments are reflective of a noticeable deceleration in monetary expansion and the debilitating impact of high debt levels.

Synchronized Global Monetary Deceleration

All major central banks around the world – the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the People's Bank of China (PBOC) – are simultaneously presiding over a significant contraction in their respective M2 year-over-year growth rates. The reduction in growth of the U.S.

reserve, monetary and credit aggregates, along with a major flattening in the yield curve, has been followed by weaker M2 growth in China, the euro area and Japan. Part of this impact is captured by the concept of world dollar liquidity.

World Dollar Liquidity

The U.S. dollar is still the world's reserve currency and the Federal Reserve, de facto, its central bank. Under this assumption, economist Rod McKnew developed the concept of world dollar liquidity, which is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and Treasury securities owned by foreign central banks held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Chart 1). This measure, which was expanding at nearly a 21% growth rate from 2009-2014, has dramatically shifted its trajectory to essentially no expansion from 2015 to May 2018. Thus, by tightening monetary conditions domestically, the Fed also drained liquidity globally.




Chart 1




Chart 2

Europe

On a year-over-year basis, euro area M2 growth peaked slightly below 7% in mid- to late 2015, less than a year after the end of the Fed’s third and final quantitative easing program (QE). Since late 2015, M2 growth slowed to 5.2% for the 12 months ending September 2017 and then saw an even sharper decline to 4.4% for the 12 months ending May 2018. This downward shift continued even as the ECB engaged in QE throughout the period. The ECB will continue to pursue QE until the policy terminates in December 2018 (Chart 2).

China

In China, year-over-year M2 growth was 13.7 % in November 2015, the last month before the current Fed tightening cycle began. In May



Chart 3




Chart 4

2018, the annual growth rate fell sharply to 8.9%, a near record low since 2000. April and May’s historically weak M2 expansion is notable since it appears the PBOC’s reserve requirement cuts failed to reverse the trend (Chart 3).

Japan

The BOJ has been engaged in QE and interest rates have been negative or near zero, and yet, Japan’s M2 growth rate has continued to fall as U.S. monetary restraint intensified. In the twelve months ending in May 2018, M2 increased by just 3.2%. This was nearly a 25% deceleration in growth from October 2017. Looking back, May’s M2 growth is below the entry point of the 2014 recession. It is not surprising, with the sharp deceleration in money, that Japan’s economy contracted in the first quarter of 2018 by 0.6% (Chart 4).

It appears that the ceasing of growth in world dollar liquidity since 2015 has had a noticeable, deleterious impact on the world’s monetary expansion.

Velocity and U.S. Recessions

Money velocity (V) is determined by a complex mathematical function and influenced by secular, short-term and cyclical factors. Secular factors are persistent and will prevail over time. Short-term factors, like massive swings in

inventory investment, are quick to fade. Cyclical factors may hold sway around economic turning points, particularly when the economy is shifting from expansion to contraction. The complexity should not be surprising since $V = GDP / M2$ and $GDP = C + I + G + X$. Anything that influences consumption, investment, government spending or net exports will have some influence on velocity. Thus, Irving Fisher's equation of exchange ($GDP = M2 \times V$) is only the starting point in assessing fluctuations in velocity.

The dominant secular determinant of velocity appears to be the GDP-generating capacity of debt, which is declining in all major economies worldwide. Money and debt are created simultaneously. If the debt produces a sustaining income stream to repay principal and interest, then velocity will rise since GDP will eventually increase beyond the initial borrowing. If advancing debt produces increasingly smaller gains in GDP, then V falls. Financing consumption may temporarily boost GDP and velocity over short timespans, but it does not generate new funds to meet longer term debt servicing obligations. Consistent with this interpretation, velocity has dramatically fallen since 1998 for all four economies: the U.S., Europe, Japan and China (Chart 5).

Secularly, velocity is below historical norms in all four major economic powers. As the productivity of the debt has fallen significantly over the past twenty years, so has velocity. In the

more heavily indebted Japan, China and the euro area, velocity is lower than the less indebted United States. Thus, other than for short non-sustaining episodes, velocity will reinforce, not offset, the decrease in M2 growth evident worldwide.

U.S. velocity is estimated to have risen again in the second quarter after small quarterly increases since mid-2017. Historically, such increases have occurred when M2's growth has dropped sharply, as seen in the current Fed cycle. Both Milton Friedman and Irving Fisher wrote about this cyclical tendency, and Fisher's equation of exchange is key to understanding such an event. Counting the recessions of the early 1980s as one, there have been 20 contractions since 1900 and M2 growth decelerated prior to 17 of these recessions. With GDP as the ultimate coincident indicator and M2 as the leading indicator then, algebraically, velocity will lag. Consequently, velocity has risen going into the vast majority of all these recessions (Chart 6).

The slowdown in money growth, combined with secular weakness in velocity, indicates that the global aggregate demand curve over time will shift inward, simultaneously weakening inflation and economic growth. Since inflation is a money-price-wage spiral, the longer-term inflation risks are clearly to the downside. Monetary policy operations will restrain future economic growth and the impact will be surprising due to the long-lagged effects.




Chart 5




Chart 6

**Diminishing Returns -
Consequences of Excess Debt**

Diminishing returns rests upon the production function that states physical output is determined by the inputs or factors of production. When a factor of production, such as capital, initially increases, output rises at an increasing rate. As excess use of that factor continues to advance, the rate of gains in output slow, flatten, and eventually turn down, a condition referred to as negative returns. Thus, the relationship between the excess use of a factor of production and the output is nonlinear.

Using this theory – that the excess application of an input will lead to diminishing returns – it is possible to see why academic work has concluded that excess application of debt within an economy leads to slower economic growth in a nonlinear fashion. If debt is adjusted for price level changes, then debt is in real or physical terms and thus consistent with the law of diminishing returns. The pattern of unexpected economic weakness in heavily indebted economies has been repeated frequently in Japan, Europe, China and the emerging markets. Japan, the most indebted nation, experienced three additional recessions after the 2008-09 recession. Among the world’s major economic areas, the U.S. economy presently stands out. The disparity in this performance is an

GDP Generating Capacity of Global Debt: All Major Economies				
		2007 Ratio of GDP to Debt	2017 Ratio of GDP to Debt	% change
1.	Euro Area	0.46	0.38	-17.2%
2.	United Kingdom	0.44	0.35	-19.3%
3.	Japan	0.33	0.27	-17.6%
4.	United States	0.45	0.40	-10.6%
5.	China	0.68	0.39	-42.9%

Source: Bank of International Settlements. Table 1

GDP Generating Capacity of Global Debt: All Major Economies (cont.)				
		2007 Ratio of GDP to Debt	2017 Ratio of GDP to Debt	% change
1.	G (20) aggregate	0.48	0.41	-14.4%
2.	Emerging markets (aggregate)	0.83	0.52	-37.0%
3.	All reporting countries (aggregate)	0.48	0.41	-14.5%
4.	Advanced economies (aggregate)	0.42	0.36	-13.5%

Source: Bank of International Settlements. Table 2

unseen consequence from the excess use of debt.

After decades of overuse, debt is increasingly less productive in all of these areas. Ten years ago, the debt overhang was centered in the U.S., the euro area and Japan. Currently, all major economic regions fit this description as China and the emerging markets now separately carry record levels of debt relative to GDP. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) shows that in 2017, one dollar of nonfinancial debt generated \$0.40, \$0.38, \$0.39, \$0.35 and \$0.27 of GDP, respectively, in the U.S., the euro area, China, the U.K. and Japan (Tables 1 & 2). All of these data points have significantly worsened over the last decade, the greatest deterioration being that of China which has declined by 43% since 2008. Among all regions, Japan’s debt exhibited the weakest level of debt productivity at \$0.27. While one dollar of emerging market debt produced a seemingly enviable \$0.52 of GDP in 2017, this ratio was down 38% from 2007.

Technology and Diminishing Returns

In addition to capital, output is a function of labor, natural resources and technology. Thus, one of these latter three factors must accelerate in order to offset the overuse of debt if production growth is to accelerate and thus boost the standard of living. Natural resources and labor are unlikely to be of immediate benefit. New discoveries of raw materials have been occurring, but only serve to balance exhaustion of known supplies.

Labor is not promising for the near-term since demographics remain bleak in the U.S. and globally. Technology is another factor that must not be overlooked. While many dramatic advances are underway, the role of invention in the future trend of U.S. and global growth is more complex than is generally understood.

Robert J. Gordon, a distinguished Professor of Economics at Northwestern University and author of *The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War* (2016), considers today's inventions to be more evolutionary than revolutionary since they do not entail the massive use of labor and natural resources of the past. Gordon looked at inventions from the great American economic growth era of 1870 to 1970. The five major inventions – electricity, modern communications, the internal combustion engine, urban sanitation, and pharmaceuticals and chemicals – greatly enhanced the demand for labor and natural resources, and resulted in complete economic involvement. Information technology, while life changing in many ways, impacts a narrower economic segment. Furthermore, business productivity from the late 20th century's digital revolution has stalled these past two decades due to innovation saturation. Viewed from a longer-term perspective, the differential effect of present inventions is already apparent. In his working paper, "Why Has Economic Growth Slowed When Innovation Appears to Be Accelerating?" (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018), Gordon calculates that the decline in economic growth in the last decade is a stunning seven times lower than the average growth rate for the fifty years between 1920 and 1970, in real GDP per capita terms.

If Gordon's view is somewhat overstated, it nevertheless appears that some current technological inventions will tend to depress demand for two other factors of production – labor and natural resources. According to available data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are approximately 3.25 million cashiers, 1.96 million driving trucks and 2 million operating machine

tools and assembly lines. Using robots for these functions does not materially change the demand for natural resources but renders obsolete more than 7 million jobs.

Looking Ahead

The spring quarter's growth will reflect a bounce from the first quarter's noticeable weakness but a reversion to a more modest expansion will be evident in the latter half of the year since there has been no change in the long-term growth constraints on the U.S. economy. It is evident that the major policy and structural issues, such as over-indebtedness, the reliance on additional debt to provide growth, poor demographics, technological constraints and potential trade conflicts, will continue to weigh heavily against ebullient growth.

The long end of the Treasury bond market has, in our view, reflected the harsh realities which are constraining economic expansion. When the Fed began its current regime of restraint in late 2015, the thirty-year Treasury bond yield was around 3%, similar to where it is today. The market has been buffeted by numerous transitory factors, with the yield moving above and below this level. Many of these developments entailed market psychology and a potpourri of inconsistent developments that will not impact long-term fundamental economic conditions. While long bond yields can rise as result of a replay of similarly unpredictable events or the current monetary stance, the structurally weak U.S. economy does not support current interest rate levels. The excess levels of debt continue to amass and the short-term beneficial aspects of even higher levels of debt are likely to be increasingly fleeting. Moreover, the growth impediments on the U.S. economy are more serious in many other parts of the world. As Friedman rigorously proved, a noticeable period of monetary deceleration, now synchronized globally, is consistent with lower, not higher, interest rates.

Van R. Hoisington
Lacy H. Hunt, Ph.D.

Legal information and disclosures

Hoisington Investment Management Company (HIMCO) is a Texas-based investment advisor registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, in addition to being registered with the Ontario Securities Commission. HIMCO is not registered as an investment adviser in any other jurisdictions and is not soliciting investors outside the U.S.

HIMCO specializes in the management of fixed income portfolios and is not affiliated with any parent organization. The Macroeconomic Fixed Income strategy invests only in U.S. Treasury securities, typically investing in the long-dated securities during a multi-year falling inflationary environment and investing in the short-dated securities during a multi-year rising inflationary environment.

Information herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but HIMCO does not warrant its completeness or accuracy; opinion and estimates constitute our judgment as of this date and are subject to change without notice. This memorandum expresses the views of the authors as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. HIMCO has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein.

This material is for informational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. Certain information contained herein concerning economic data is based on or derived from information provided by independent third-party sources. Charts and graphs provided herein are for illustrative purposes only.

This memorandum, including the information contained herein, may not be copied, reproduced, republished, or posted in whole or in part, in any form without the prior written consent of HIMCO.